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The Changing Climate for United States Law
David M. Driesen*

Just a few years ago, the subject of American climate change law would not merit an article like this one, let alone the book that the American Bar Association has recently published on the subject.1 But the United States has changed, at least somewhat. At the
moment, most important United States climate change law consists of state and local
law, but there are signs that the federal government may create significant climate
change law as well, at least after President Bush leaves office.2
This article has two goals. The obvious one is simply to describe some of the American
climate change law’s more important aspects. The second goal involves raising some
questions about the dominant neoliberal approach to climate change in the United
States, an approach that has heavily influenced the Kyoto Protocol and the law of countries implementing the Kyoto Protocol.3 I mean by this an approach that basically treats
climate change as an economic problem, rather than as a legal problem of how to
address an environmental crisis. Economics, of course, has something important to contribute to climate change law. But U.S. policy-makers have exhibited an unfortunate tendency to apply free market worship, rather than careful legal analysis informed by economics and other disciplines, to address climate change. I will only have space here to
introduce these considerations briefly as I describe some key United States programs.

I. Federal Law
President Bush repudiated the Kyoto Protocol on
economic grounds, finding that implementing the
relatively modest reductions called for would be too
burdensome for the American economy.4 Such a
stance stands in sharp contrast to President Reagan’s
position on ozone depleting chemicals, which
assumed that once grounds existed to think that an
international environmental problem was serious,
we should address it vigorously if doing so was fea* David Driesen is the Angela S. Cooney Professor of Law at
Syracuse University College of Law, Syracuse, New York.
1 See Gerrard, Michael B. (ed.), Global Climate Change and U.S.
Law, Chicago, Ill., 2007 (hereinafter U.S. Law). Cf. Engel, Kirsten
H. & Saleska, Scott R., Subglobal Regulation of the Global
Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 Ecology L. Q. 2005,
p. 183, at p. 215 (arguing, just a few years ago, that most state
and local laws did not aggressively reduce greenhouse gas
emissions).
2 U.S. Law, supra note 1, at p. 1.
3 See Driesen, David M., Sustainable Development and Market
Liberalism’s Shotgun Wedding, 83 Indiana L. J., 2007 (forthcoming) (explaining that environmental benefit trading came into
the Kyoto Protocol at the United States’ behest).

sible. Under Reagan, the United States led the
world to an agreement phasing out the principle
ozone depleting chemicals. President Bush also
denounced the Kyoto accord for not including
developing country commitments to emission reductions,5 thereby ignoring a justice principle the
United States had agreed to when it ratified the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change,6 the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.7 This principle implicitly recognized that in light of developed countries’ historical
4 See U.S. Law, supra note 1, at p. 19 (stating that President Bush
repudiated the Kyoto Protocol, because it would seriously damage
the economy). I characterize the Kyoto reductions as “modest,”
because they are a small portion of the reductions necessary to
avoid dangerous climate change. I make no claims here about
whether achieving Kyoto targets would be difficult or not. Because
U.S. emissions rose substantially after 1990, realizing a 7 % cut in
emissions would require a much larger cut below current levels.
5 Id.
6 29 May 1992, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 849
(hereinafter FCCC). See generally Bodansky, Daniel, The United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 Yale J. Int’l L. 1993, p. 451.
7 FCCC, Art. 3, sec. 1.
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responsibility for climate change and their superior
capabilities in evolving technologies to address it,
developed countries would have to reduce greenhouse gas emissions before developing countries
did so.8 Thus, President Bush, perhaps unwittingly,
reflected a market-oriented perspective and repudiated legally enacted principles of justice. Consistent
with the idea of free market worship, he has continued to rely on ineffectual voluntary measures to
address global climate change and U.S. greenhouse
gas emissions have continued to rise.9
This year, however, may have marked a turning
point in the federal stance toward climate change.
The Supreme Court decided its first global warming case, Massachusetts v. EPA.10 While the Court’s
decision in this case seems rather narrow from a
legal perspective, it carries enormous symbolic significance. The Court held that greenhouse gases
constitute pollutants under the Clean Air Act.11 As
such, EPA must regulate them if it concludes that
they endanger public health or the environment.12
Still, if the Bush administration remains committed
to doing nothing it can probably stall regulation for
its remaining time in office and almost surely can
adopt weak ineffectual regulation.13 The public,
however, seems to have interpreted Massachusetts
v. EPA as lending the Court’s prestige to the goal of

meaningfully addressing climate change, so that
federal climate change law seems inevitable,14 at
least once President Bush leaves office.
A number of bills pending in Congress address
climate change and use the emissions trading
approach that has dominated Kyoto implementation.15 Emissions trading builds on a performance
standard in that it requires government to pass
laws quantitatively limiting the emissions of polluters.16 But under a trading approach polluters can
forego local compliance if they purchase extra emission reductions from elsewhere.17 Of course, an
emissions trading program, like a performance
standard, only stands a chance of working well if
the government establishing the underlying performance standard addresses the old legal question
of how strict limits should be in a credible manner.18 The Congressional bills vary in how strict the
underlying emissions limits are, as shown in figure
one (see opposite page).19
A few of the Congressional bills are quite ambitious, with one of them demanding an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels
by 2050.20 Unfortunately, many of them are terribly inadequate.
A technical legal feature of the McCain-Lieberman bill (named for Republican Presidential con-

8 See Driesen, David M., Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions
Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention, 26 Bost. Coll.
Envt’l Aff. L. Rev. 1, 1998, pp. 11-12 (linking the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities to the expectation that
developed countries would likely make earlier cuts in greenhouse
gas emissions); Bodansky, supra note 6, at p. 502 (explaining that
the common but differentiated responsibilities principle in the
Framework Convention reflects developing country charges regarding developed countries’ historic responsibility for climate
change and developed countries’ recognition of their superior
technological capability).

15 See Parker, Larry & Yacobucci, Brent D., Cong, Research Serv.,
RL 33846, Climate Change: Greenhouse Gas Reduction Bill in
the 110th Congress 4 (2007); Berlin, Ken & Sussman, Robert M.,
Global Warming and the Future of Coal, The Path to Carbon
Capture and Storage pp. 30-31 (2007), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org (reviewing “cap and trade”
bills pending in Congress as of May, 2007); Dernbach, John C.,
United States Policy, in U.S. Law, supra note 1, at pp. 85-90
(providing a slightly older but more analytical review of Congressional proposals).

9 See U.S. Law, supra note 1, at pp. 7, 19.
10 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007).
11 Id. at 1460 (finding that the text of the Clean Air Act shows that
greenhouse gases are pollutants).
12 Id. at 1462 (stating that EPA must regulate greenhouse gases if it
finds they contribute to global warming).
13 See id. (stating that EPA may delay regulation it if offers a reasonable explanation why it cannot determine whether greenhouse
gases contribute to global warming and has “wide discretion”
regarding the regulation’s timing and content). Furthermore,
because no statutory deadline exists for EPA action on global
warming, the legal remedy available for inaction is a suit for
“unreasonable delay.” See id. at 1472 (Scalia, J. dissenting)
(discussing the lack of a statutory deadline).
14 See Smith, Jeffrey A., Massachusetts v. EPA: The Way Forward on
Climate Change Regulation in the U.S., 3 Envtl. Liability 2007,
p. 127, at p. 127 (noting that climate change skeptics recognized that Mass. v. EPA made federal climate change legislation
“all but inevitable.”).

16 See Driesen, David M., Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program: Replacing the Command and Control/
Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1998,
p. 289, at p. 324.
17 See id. at p. 312 (providing a simple example).
18 C.f. France Haggles over Banking Rules as Second NAP Set to
Miss Deadline, Point Carbon (June 15, 2006), available at
http://www.pointcarbon.com/article16056-868.html?articleID=16056&categoryID= (mentioning a French industry’s
advocacy of a high phase two cap); Grubb, Michael et al., Allowance Allocation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme:
A Commentary, 5 Climate Pol’y 2005, p. 127, at pp. 132-33.
(describing industry lobbying’s contribution to the EU’s overallocation of phase one emission allowances); Michaelowa, Axel &
Butzengeiger, Sonja, EU Emissions Trading: Navigating Between
Scylla and Charybdis, 5 Climate Pol’y 2005, p. 1, at p. 5 (explaining how lobbying in the EU lead to goals in phase one providing little departure from “business as usual” levels of carbon
emissions).
19 Berlin & Sussman, supra note 15, at p. 31.
20 S. 3698, 109th Cong., § 702(2) (2006)
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Figure 1: Comparison of economy-wide climate change proposals in 110th congress 1990-2050
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tender John McCain and Connecticut Senator Joseph
Lieberman) may merit international attention.21
That bill contains within it the seeds of a better
approach to climate change than we have used hitherto, because it relies in part on a Dirty Input Limit
(DIL).22 A DIL limits the inputs that cause pollution,
rather than the harder to measure and more numerous outputs. Because measurement and regulation
of carbon dioxide outputs from transportation
sources is so difficult administratively, McCainLieberman may limit the amount of fossil fuel that
can be used in the transport sector.23 It is conceived
of as an upstream emissions trading program,
because it gives fossil fuel producers and importers
allowances reflecting the carbon content of their
fuels, rather than regulating drivers’ carbon outputs,
and authorizes the trading of these allowances. But
it will, if enacted, constrict use of fossil fuels, thereby encouraging substitute fuels and energy efficiency. In effect, it limits inputs, not just outputs. And it
addresses transport emissions, which have been left
out of the trading schemes enacted to date.24 On the
other hand, McCain-Lieberman uses an outputbased emissions trading approach to address stationary sources,25 like the European Union’s Emis-

sions Trading Scheme. Under this output-based
approach carbon dioxide emitters must hold allowances for every unit of carbon dioxide released into
the air,26 but may trade allowances27, either selling
allowances if they emit less than they are allowed, or
buying somebody else’s emission reduction if they
plan to emit carbon in excess of their allowances
locally. This combination means that those who produce fossil fuels can escape limiting them if they
purchase credits from those lowering emissions in
other ways.28 This flexibility will improve cost effectiveness, but may limit the impetus for the key technological innovations ultimately needed to address
climate change.
21 Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280, 110th
Cong., First Sess. (2007).
22 See David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument:
Dirty Input Limits (forthcoming 2008).
23 See S. 280, supra note 21, §§ 121(a)(2),(b); 162(e)
24 See id. § 121(b).
25 See id. § 121(a)(1).
26 See id.
27 See id. § 141.
28 See § 141(b).
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In a forthcoming article, Amy Sinden and I will
argue that a DIL offers substantial advantages over
an output-based approach. Suffice it to say for present purposes that the McCain-Lieberman bill takes
seriously the legal questions of who needs to be regulated in order to adequately address an environmental problem and how to make regulation enforceable, not just the cost effectiveness of emissions trading. By paying attention to legal questions
while still incorporating some of the learning from
economics, it has proposed a significant legal improvement.
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nificantly advance global efforts to address global
warming for a variety of reasons. First, California is
a significant emitter of greenhouse gases by itself.37
Second, under the Clean Air Act, other states may
copy California standards, and 11 states representing 33% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions have
done so.38 Third, the states adopting California
standards probably provide a sufficiently large market to make it economical to produce vehicles complying with California standards for the entire
United States, thereby realizing economies of
scale.39 Finally, other countries may adopt or build
upon California standards.40

II. State Law
As Congress has enacted none of these bills, the
most significant American law on climate change at
the moment comes from the states,29 especially the
populous states of the northeastern region and
California30 . This law relies upon American federalism, which generally permits state autonomy in
supplementing federal environmental protection.31
Under the Supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution, however, Congress may supersede
state law.32 And one of these programs raises a substantial preemption question.

29 See Hodas, David, State Initiatives, in U.S. Law, supra note 1, at
p. 351 (noting that 28 of the 50 states have completed “some
sort of climate action plan.”); Engel, Kirsten H., Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach,
14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L. Rev. 54 (2005); Rabe, Barry G. et al., State
Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14
N.Y.U. Envtl. L. Rev. 2005, p. 1.
30 Engel, Kirsten H., State and Local Climate Change Initiatives:
What is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a
Global Problem and What Does this Say About Environmental
Law, 38 Urban Lawyer 2006, p. 1015, at p. 1016 (characterizing
California as a climate change leader, but with company, especially in the northeast). Cf. Engel, supra note 29, p. 54.
31 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7416. See generally Engel, Kirsten H.,
Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 Emory L. J. 2006, p. 159.
32 U.S. Const., Art. VI.

1. California Law
California has provided international leadership in
addressing vehicle emissions. The hybrid vehicles
available for sale exist because California’s Low
Emissions Vehicle program contains sufficiently
tough emission limits to make unconventional technologies viable.33 California does not itself produce
significant numbers of automobiles. But California,
since the 1950s, has demanded that vehicles sold in
its jurisdiction meet emission standards.34 Congress
generally authorized California to continue regulating vehicle emissions, even when it preempted other
state regulation of vehicles in the 1970 Clean Air Act
Amendments, the law that first established a significant federal role in addressing air pollution.35
Recently, California has used this authority to
address vehicle carbon dioxide emissions. It has
enacted standards that require, by 2030, a 33%
reduction in new passenger vehicle carbon dioxide
emissions and a 25% reduction in new light duty
truck emissions.36 These requirements might sig-

33 See Driesen, David M., Sustainable Development and Air
Quality: The Need to Replace Basic Technologies with Cleaner
Alternatives, 10 Buff. Envtl. L. J. 2003, p. 25, at pp. 48-49.
34 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl.
Conservation, 17 F.3d 2nd Cir. 1994, p. 521, at p. 524 (noting
that several states adopted emission standards with California as
the leader).
35 See id. at p. 525.
36 California Air Resources Board (CARB), Initial Statement of Reasons for Proposed Rulemaking, Public Hearing to Consider
Adoption of Regulations to Control Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Motor Vehicles vi, 2004.
37 See Wanless Eric et al., A Golden Opportunity: California’s Solutions for global Warming 2, 2007, available at
http://www.nrdc.org (showing California’s emissions as greater
than those of Mexico, France, and South Africa).
38 See Mathew Visick, The California Global Warming Solutions
Act in 2006: California’s Final Steps toward Comprehensive
Greenhouse Gas Regulation, 13 Hastings West Northwest J. of
Envtl. L. & Pol’y 2007, p. 249, at p. 252.
39 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 2007, p. 1438, at p. 1452
(discussing the likelihood of U.S. standards being adopted abroad).
40 CARB, supra note 36, at p. ix (pointing out that other jurisdictions have often adopted “motor vehicle contros . . . pioneered in
California”). Cf. IP/07/155 & MEMO/07/46 (Brussels 7 February
2007) (outlining a plan for EU legislation lowering vehicle emissions); COM(2007)(10) Commission Communication Results of
the review of the Community Strategy to Reduce CO2 Emissions
from Cars (24 January 2007).
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The automobile manufacturers, however, have
claimed that federal law preempts these standards.41 Since vehicle manufacturers are likely to
comply with carbon dioxide output standards by
improving vehicle energy efficiency, they have
argued that these are really Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards in disguise.42 And the
federal energy law preempts state CAFE standards.43 California characterizes its law as an air pollution regulation that it has the right to enact under
the Clean Air Act.44 The Supreme Court bolstered
California’s position on this when it held that carbon
dioxide was a pollutant under the Clean Air Act.45
The California carbon dioxide standards show
what government can accomplish when it declines
to embrace economics as a religion, yet allows it to
inform its decisions. The automobile manufacturers asked the California Air Resources Board
(CARB) to allow them to comply with its standards

41 See Brief of Appellant, Michael J. Kenny, in Central Valley
Chrysler-Plymouth v. Kenny, 2002 WL 32298115 (9th Cir.).
42 See 49 U.S.C. § 32902.
43 See 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a).
44 See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 41.
45 See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at p. 1459 (concluding that greenhouse gases are pollutants under the Clean Air Act).
46 See CARB, supra note 36, at p. vii (declining to “dilute” the
technology-forcing character of LEV by allowing credits for nonvehicle related offsets).
47 See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 3, at ___ (discussing the positive
spillovers associated with relatively expensive technological
innovation).
48 See Driesen, David M., Design, Trading and Innovation, in Freeman, Jody & Kolstad, Charles (eds.), Moving to Markets in
Environmental Regulation: Lessons from Twenty Years of Experience, 2007, pp. 438-443 (explaining innovation’s value and
why trading discourages high cost innovation, which may have
substantial long-term value); Driesen, supra note 8, at 43 (pointing out that trading can create incentives to deploy traditional
innovation abroad in lieu of domestic innovation).
49 See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 13, § 1961.1(a),(b) (2007).
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by allowing them to purchase offset credits, i.e.
emission reductions made without changing vehicle design. While this would obviously lower compliance costs, CARB rejected the request. It noted,
correctly, that this efficiency maximizing approach
would eliminate the incentive to significantly
advance vehicle technology.46 I have argued elsewhere that advancing fundamental technologies is
important to the long-term effort to address climate
change.47 This advancement will frequently requires using expensive approaches that have the
capacity to change technology over time. While
such investments have substantial long-term payoffs, both in terms of increasing our capacity to
address climate change and reducing the long-term
costs of doing so, they frequently do not represent
the least cost compliance options from a short-term
perspective.48 CARB, while taking care to maintain
the incentives needed to advance technology for the
long-term, did not neglect short-term efficiency
considerations, as it did allow manufacturers to use
a fleet-average approach to compliance, so that the
vehicle fleet as a whole, rather than each vehicle,
must comply.49
In 2005, Governor Swartzeneger of California
issued an Executive Order demanding reduction of
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2020 and to
80% below 1990 levels by 2050.50 In 2006, California passed the Global Warming Solutions Act,
which requires state-wide reductions of overall carbon emission to 1990 levels by 2020.51 California
has just begun to implement this bill, but is expected to rely heavily upon a cap-and-trade approach.
California has provided real leadership in addressing global warming.

2. The Northeast States Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)

50 Cal. Government Code § 12812.6 (west 2007) (electronic note).
51 Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 38500-38597 (2007). See Wanless et al., supra note 37; Hodas, David, State Initiatives, in
U.S. Law, supra note 1, at p. 352.
52 See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), Memorandum
of Understanding (2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/
(hereinafter RGGI MOU); Note, The Compact Clause and the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2007,
p. 1958, at pp. 1959-1960 (describing the political process establishing RGGI). These states are Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine.
53 Regional Greenhouse Gas initiative, Overview 1 (2005), available at, http://www.rggi.org.
54 See RGGI MOU, supra note 52, § 2.

Ten northeastern states have agreed to a regional
program limiting electric utility emissions in these
states.52 This program merits extended treatment
here, because the program contains several significant legal innovations.
The program caps regional electric utility emissions through 2014 and then reduces those emissions to 10% below these levels by 2018,53 sort of.
I say sort of because this is a trading program,
which allows utilities to purchase credits in lieu of
local compliance.54

38
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This program, however, contains limits on the use
of offsets, credits obtained from sources not subject
to the RGGI cap. These limits reflect attention to
legal considerations and improve the integrity of
the program. In the past, when U.S. regulators have
allowed the use of offsets, many of them have been
fraudulent.55 There are a lot of games polluters can
play with offsets to avoid making real progress on
air pollution control. Accordingly, RGGI limits offsets to 3.3% of reported emissions and requires two
tons of carbon for every one ton of credit from offsets realized outside the region.56 This discount for
out-of-region credits reflects a balance between
enforceability concerns and the theoretical efficiency possible through a geographically broad offset
market, as RGGI regulators will have difficulty
assuring the integrity of offsets reflecting activities
in jurisdictions in which they have no regulatory
power. RGGI also limits the types of offsets that will
be recognized with an eye toward assuring the program’s environmental integrity.57 RGGI regulators,
like their counterparts on the CDM board, will
review project methodologies, thus learning from
the international law on this.58
Furthermore, the RGGI states may auction off
allowances on a large scale, which would constitute
a significant advance, as previous programs have
relied on offering allowances to free, a grandfathering approach. The RGGI agreement among the
states requires that 25% of the allowances be “allocated for a consumer benefit or strategic energy
purpose.”59 The regulatory agencies recognize that
auctioning off 25% of the allowances would provide a fund for these general purposes.60 Furthermore, New York, which is a large and influential
state, has committed to auctioning 100% of its
allowances and the other states may well follow
suit.61 With limited exceptions, the EU trading
scheme (like the U.S. acid rain program), gave away
allowances to polluters. This give-away provided
windfall profits to polluters. The Northeastern
states seem to have learned something from this
experience. Economists have long recommended
auctions to prevent windfall profits, improve efficiency, and raise revenue.
An early landmark law review article on emissions trading by Bruce Ackerman (Yale Law School)
and Richard Stewart (New York University Law
School) recommended the sale of allowances to
raise money to boost enforcement and monitoring.62 The RGGI states will decide individually pre-

1| 2007

cisely how to use auction revenue, although a joint
regional operating authority will likely conduct the
actual auctions. Some of these states may choose to
devote all or part of this revenue to funding energy
efficiency improvements.63 This would lower the
cost of the program to consumers and improve the
political case for extending the program.
The RGGI program contains “price triggers,“
which reflect the exquisite cost sensitivity of the
neoliberal United States. A price trigger relaxes
compliance obligations if allowance prices go too
high. In the past, we have implemented fairly ambitious measures without price triggers, notwithstanding arguments that they will prove too costly.
Apparently, we did not believe these arguments or
we believed that we should protect the environment and human health even if doing so proved
costly. In the current political climate, however, a
price trigger can assure regulated firms or skittish
government officials that environmental measures
won’t prove too burdensome.
RGGI actually contains two price triggers. If
allowances reach $7/ton, the program raises the limit
on offset credits to 5% of total emissions and gives

55 See Driesen, supra note n. 16, notes 120-127 and accompanying text (reviewing evidence and refuting defenses of bubbles’
integrity in the economics literature); California Air Resources
Board and United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Phase III Rule Effectiveness Study of the Aerospace coating Industry 4 (1990) (finding that almost all large sources operating
under a bubble are not achieving required reductions); Liroff,
Richard A., Reforming Air Pollution Regulation: The Toil and
Trouble of EPA’s bubble 1986, pp. 62-67, 89-91. (providing
examples); David Doniger, The Dark Side of the Bubble, 4
Envtl. F., July 1985, p. 33, at pp. 34-35 (same); Liroff, Richard
A., Air Pollution Offsets: trading, Selling and Banking 1980,
p. 22 (explaining that offsets can be a “meaningless paper
game”). I use the term “fraudulent” here as a shorthand for a
host of abuses that make offsets produce less reductions than
planned or no real additional reductions, not in the technical
legal sense of involving a deliberate attempt to deceive.
56 RGGI MOU, supra note 52, § 2F(2).
57 See Id. § 2(F)(1).
58 See id. § 2(F)(c)
59 Id. § 2(g)(1).
60 See generally Burtraw, Dallas et al., Auction Design for Selling
CO2 Emission Allowances under the Regional Greenhouse Gas
initiative: Phase One Research Report Draft 2 n. 1, May 25,
2007, available at http://www.rggi.org (linking the auction to the
consumer benefit provision).
61 See id.
62 See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives,
13 Col. J. Envtl. L. 1988, p. 171, at pp. 180-183.
63 See Burtraw et al., supra note 60, at p. 2 n. 1 (stating that states
will use this revenue to fund energy efficiency improvements,
reduce electricity rates, or fund clean energy).
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full credit (instead of half credit) for offsets coming
from outside the region.64 At $10 a ton, various deadline extensions kick in and offsets can rise to 20% of
total emissions.65 Another area of interest constitutes
the issue of set asides. RGGI authorizes its member
states to set aside allowances for various purposes,
such as encouraging renewable energy.66 Economists
tend to prefer complete reliance on an auction, and
dislike set asides, because auctions are efficient in the
sense that they allocate credits to their highest and
best use. Unfortunately, incumbents facing expensive abatement possibilities seem likely to outbid

64 RGGI MOU, supra note 52, § 2(F)(3); Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, Amendment to Memorandum of Understanding,
§ 4(a) (2006), available at http://www.rggi.org (hereinafter RGGI
Amendment).
65 RGGI MOU, supra note 52, § 2(E)(2)(b); RGGI Amendment,
§ 5(a).
66 See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rule,
§ xx5.3(d),(e) (2007), available at http://www.rggi.org.
67 See Barry G. Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of State
Renewable Energy Standards, 7 Sust. Dev’t L. & Pol’y 2007,
p. 10, at p. 10 (23 states and the District of Columbia had renewable portfolio standards by mid-2007).
68 See Rabe, Barry G., Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of
State Renewable Portfolio Standards v, 2006, p. 4 (stating that
more than half of the U.S. population lives in states with a
renewable portfolio standard and showing that these states
include Texas, Illinois, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
California).
69 See Driesen, supra note 3, at ___; Mendonça, Miguel, Feed-In
Tariffs: Accelerating the Development of Renewable energy xiv,
2007 (characterizing the “feed-in tariff” as the most successful
policy instrument for stimulating low cost renewable energy
deployment). See also Taylor, Margaret R., Rubin, Edward S. and
Hounshell, David A., Regulation as the Mother of Invention: The
Case of SO2 Control, 27 L. & Pol’y 2005, p. 348, at pp. 370 (the
acid rain trading program stimulated less innovation that prior
“command and control” regulation); David Popp, Pollution
Control Innovations and the Clean Air Act of 1990, 22 J. Pol’y
Analysis & Mgm’t 2003, p. 641 (agreeing with this conclusion,
but finding that trading did better at stimulating performance
enhancing, rather than cost reducing, innovation).
70 See Driesen, Design, Trading, and Innovation, supra note 48, at
pp. 440-443 (explaining why trading does not encourage expensive innovation). See also Driesen, David M. Does Emissions
Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 Envt’l L. Rep., 2003, p.
10094, pp. 10095-10106. I frame this conclusion in somewhat
equivocal terms, because instrument choice is not the only factor relevant to stimulation of innovation. While emissions trading in principle discourages less high cost innovation than a
performance standard of identical stringency and scope, stringent emissions trading can encourage innovation. A very stringent emissions trading standard would encourage more innovation than a very lax renewable portfolio standard. But absent
great disparity in ambition, a renewable portfolio standard will
systematically favor innovation more than a trading program.
See Driesen, supra note 3, at ___ (explaining that narrow trading
programs encourage more innovation than comparably
designed broad trading programs).
71 See Dernbach, John C. et al., Stabilizing and then Reducing U.S.
Energy Consumption: Legal and Policy Tools for Efficiency and
Conservation, 37 Envt’l L. Rep. (Envt’l L. Inst.) 2007, p. 10003.
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others for allowances. This is not a bad thing, but the
long-term goal of climate change should be to move
the industry toward zero emissions, since greenhouse gases accumulate in the atmosphere and
remain there so long. This goal might be better
achieved by giving some allowances to those with
zero emissions, perhaps in proportion to their share
of electricity generation. They could then sell these
allowances to those with expensive abatement
options and get revenues that effectively subsidize
zero emissions. Such an approach might encourage
more investment in zero emission approaches than a
direct subsidy, because it would signal that the only
way to reliably obtain sufficient allowances would be
to operate a zero emissions facility. This approach
would have to be balanced against the objective of
assuring a stable supply of electricity, most of which
comes from coal-fired power plants at the moment.
But policy considerations should enter in here.
Efficiency should not be the sole goal of the system.
Still, with or without appropriate set-asides, auctions
constitute a significant advance, and appropriately
draw on economic teachings.

3. Renewable Portfolio Standards and
Energy Efficiency
Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia
enacted renewable portfolio standards by June of
2007, which require utilities to purchase fixed portions of renewable energy to meet customer
demand.67 While this includes less than half of the
50 states, it includes many of the most populous
states with the largest utility carbon footprint.68
The map (see figure two on the next page) shows the
states with such standards and their targets.
While emissions trading has been touted as a
great simulator of innovation, targeted renewable
energy programs have proven far more effective at
stimulating meaningful technological advances so
far.69 Renewably energy programs produce more
meaningful innovation than trading, because renewables rarely provide the least cost method of
producing power.70 Therefore, programs that focus
upon technological advancement are more likely to
produce it than programs that focus on global efficiency, like emissions trading.
Energy efficiency measures also play a key role in
addressing global warming.71 Large progressive
states like California and New York have tradition-
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Figure 2: Renewable Portfolio Standards and Energy Targets in 23 States
and the District of Columbia

MT: 10% by 2015 Goal +
*WA: 15% by 2020

Xcel mandate of
1,125 MW wind by 2010

MT: 10% by 2015

VT: RE meets load
growth by 2012

WI: requirement varies by
utility; 10% by 2015 Goal

ME: 30% by 2000
10% by 2017 goal – new RE

ME: 4% by 2009 +
1% annual increase

RI: 15% by 2020
CT: 10% by 2010
CA: 20% by 2010
NV: 20% by 2015

IA: 105 MW
CO: 10% by 2015

NY: 24% by 2013
IL: 8% by 2013

NJ: 22,5% by 2021
PA: 18%1 by 2020
*MD: 7,5% by 2019

AZ: 15% by 2025

*NM: 10% by 2011

*DE: 10% by 2019
DC: 11% by 2022

TX: 5,880 MW by 2015
HI: 20% by 2020

ally addressed energy efficiency through least cost
planning.72 Under this model, utility regulators
required utilities to match supply and demand
using the least cost option, whether that option
increases supply (i.e. building a new power plant)
or reduces demand (e.g. paying for end-use energy
efficiency).73 This approach tends to favor energy
efficiency, as energy efficiency measures almost
always cost less then capacity increases.74 While
this model depends heavily on economic efficiency
principles it also reflects a decidedly non-worshipful posture toward markets.75 It recognizes that left
to their own devices utilities tend to look at electricity as a commodity and may address the possibility of demand exceeding supply uneconomically
by increasing supply.76 It demands that regulators insist on efficient approaches even when key
market actors might choose the least efficient
solutions.77
Prior to deregulation, utilities in a number of
cases cooperated in least cost planning regimes.
Since state utility regulators would build the cost of
either demand-side or supply-side measures into
the rate base, utilities sufficiently flexible to engage
in provision of energy efficient technology did not

see any business reason to oppose the programs.
Deregulation, however, converted the electricity
market into more of a conventional commodities
market, creating incentives for power plants to sell
as much electricity as possible.78 State budgets for
energy efficiency generally declined during this

72 See Cavanagh, Ralph C., Least Cost Planning Alternatives for
Electric Utilities and Their Regulators, 10 Harv. Envt’l. L. rev.
1986, p. 229.
73 See id.; Cavanagh, Ralph, Responsible Power Marketing in an
Increasingly Competitive Era, 5 Yale J. Reg. 1988, p. 331, at p.
337 (defining least cost planning).
74 Id. at p. 315 (stating that energy efficiency should “fare well” if
regulators must choose the least cost way of reconciling supply
and demand); Cavanagh, supra note 72, at p. 333 (energy conservation “frequently” costs less than increasing supply).
75 See, e.g., Cavanagh, supra note 72, at pp. 318-320 (discussing
market failures and disparities).
76 See id. at p. 302 (discussing costly errors in planning the construction of new power plants).
77 See id. at pp. 318-319 (discussing disparities between consumers’ approach to evaluating conservation investments and utility
evaluation of plant construction costs).
78 Swisher, Joel N. & McAlpin, Maria C., Environmental Impact
of Electricity Deregulation, 31 Energy 2006, p. 1067, at p. 1078
(linking decreased spending on energy efficiency to competition, because deregulation encouraged additional electricity
sales).
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neoliberal period.79 Deregulation, however, produced a huge price increase in California.80 California responded by raising its energy efficiency
expenditures to unprecedented levels.81 Other
states seem likely to follow suit, especially given the
need for energy efficiency to help pay RGGI costs.
In this area, the neoliberal perspective diverges
from the teachings of experience that experts in
energy law and policy have learned. By and large,
neoclassical economics treats energy efficiency as a
problem in getting the price right. If prices are
raised to the point where energy efficiency will be
economic, we will get energy efficiency. Experienced energy experts, however, often disagree. The
price for energy efficiency has been right for some
time; a lot of it is available at zero net costs.82 Yet,
consumers have not gone out and picked up all of
the dollar bills sitting on the sidewalk (to borrow

79 See id. at pp. 1071, 1073, 1077-78 (finding that demand side
management spending and energy savings decreased with deregulation in many states).
80 See Goldstein, David B., Saving Energy: Growing Jobs, 2007,
pp. 135-153 (explaining the link between deregulation and
California’s electricity shortage); Woo, Chi Keung, What Went
Wrong in California’s Electricity Market, 26 Energy 747 (2001)
(discussing the California price spike and its causes).
81 See Goldstein, supra note 80, at pp. 150-151 (discussing how
huge increases in efficiency funding and new standards helped
address the California crises); Vine, E., Rhee, C.H. & Lee, K.D.,
Measurement and Evaluation of Energy Efficiency Reforms: California and South Korea, 31 Energy 2006, p. 1100, at pp. 11061107 (explaining that policy-makers provided a 250% increase
in funding for energy efficiency unparalleled in U.S. history in
response to an energy supply shortfall under deregulation).
82 See Bryner, Gary C., Carbon Markets: Reducing Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Through Emissions Trading, 17 Tul. Envtl. L. J.,
2004, p. 267, at p. 271 (describing energy efficiency as a “no
regrets” option).
83 See Aune, Margrethe, Energy Comes Home, 35 Energy Pol’y
2007, ___ (forthcoming) (arguing that home energy consumption does not conform to a rational economic actor model);
Maréchal, Kevin, The Economics of Climate Change and the
Change of Climate in Economics, 35 energy Pol’y ___, __-__
(2007) (forthcoming) (explaining that overwhelming evidence
shows that consumers neglect cost saving energy efficiency);
Goldstein, supra note 80, at pp. 154-172 (discussing reasons
that markets do not produce cost effective energy efficiency).
See, e.g. Linden, Anna-Lise, Carlsson-Kanyama, Annika, Eriksson, Bjorn, Efficient and Inefficient Aspects of Residential Energy
Behavior: What are the Policy Instruments for Change, 34
Energy Pol’y 2006, p. 1918, at p. 1923 (noting that Swedish
apartment dwellers keep their dwellings hotter than homeowners, because the homeowners bear the incremental cost of
additional energy use, but the apartment dwellers do not).
84 See generally Dernbach, John C. et al., supra note 71.
85 See Driesen, supra note 3, at ___, n. __ (discussing additionality
problems with energy efficiency for offsets).
86 Cf., Healy, J. Kevin, Local Initiatives, in U.S. Law, supra note 1,
at pp. 430-432 (stating that 320 mayors had pledged to at least
meet Kyoto targets by October of 2006).
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the economists’ metaphor to justify their faith on
this matter).83 If the energy experts are correct, it
follows that emissions trading, which creates a price
for carbon, will not be the key to realizing energy
efficiency improvements. More likely, energy efficiency improvements will come from information
programs to make consumers and businesses aware
of the environmentally valuable economic opportunities available and some government standard setting for energy efficiency.84 Furthermore, for technical reasons, incorporating energy efficiency into a
trading program is extremely awkward and may
actually result in lost emission reductions.85

III. Where are We Headed?
The failure of the United States to seriously address
climate change has disappointed many of its allies
and impeded chances for adequate global agreements. Because the United States has been the
world’s leading greenhouse gas emitter for some
time, many countries have an interest in knowing
where the United States is going on this issue.
The analysis thus far suggests that this question
is complex because the United States consists of a
large number of important political subunits, many
of which have their own climate change policies.
This article has not even mentioned the numerous
local and city governments that have committed to
meeting Kyoto targets locally, primarily through
energy efficiency measures.86
There are grounds for hope that the United
States’ federal government will, in the near future,
resume its former position as a reasonably responsible international actor with respect to this issue.
Many companies witnessing the growth of fragmented state and local law have become supportive
of the idea of federal regulation addressing global
warming.
Unfortunately, as the RGGI program’s limited
scope and late deadlines and California’s Global
Warming’s Solutions Act’s numbers suggest, it’s too
late for the United States to reach its Kyoto targets
on time. More importantly, there’s real doubt about
whether the United States and the rest of the world
will act vigorously and quickly enough to avoid
dangerous climate change in the post-Kyoto period.
Most scientific estimates of the amount of reductions required to avoid many of the most serious climate change impacts envisions leveling off global
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emissions in the near term and reducing emissions
to more than 50% below 1990 levels globally by
2050.87 Because it will not be possible to fairly
demand that rapidly growing countries like China
and India reduce emissions until after developed
countries deliver substantial reductions, developed
country emissions will have to fall by much more
than 50% by 2050. Such numbers are daunting,
especially for a country that has unwisely postponed serious efforts.
Many environmental law experts who believe
that the United States will act fairly soon remain
concerned. In the past, U.S. regulatory programs of
the scope necessary to address global warming have
proceeded haltingly and slowly. Even in the years
before neoliberalism’s ascendancy, special interest
opposition, the complexity of administrative law,
and the technical complexity of the underlying
problems led the law to fall seriously short of its
ambitions.88 Doing much better than we have in
the past presents a profound legal challenge. We see
already some institutional changes that might help.
RGGI has produced an unusually close collaboration between energy and environmental regulators,
who sometimes work separately on the same problems. While some of the bills in Congress leave too
many decisions to EPA, some of them reflect their
sponsors’ willingness to have Congress itself decide
key questions about the scope and timing of reductions, thereby following the model of the successful
programs addressing acid rain and ozone depletion.89 While these developments are positive, we
will need great legal ingenuity to produce the rapid
and significant changes that we will need to adequately address global warming.
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At the moment, the United States’ stance toward
international negotiations has softened in tone if
not in substance. As the United States moves
toward addressing climate change domestically, it
will become more cooperative in international
negotiations. The inability of the United States to
achieve Kyoto targets may, however, make it awkward for the United States to play a leadership role.
During President Bush’s remaining time in office
U.S. agreement to binding mass-based caps remain
unlikely. After he leaves office, however, a new
President will shape the U.S. position on global climate change.

IV. Conclusion
Economics will continue to inform United States
climate change policy. But law too has a role to play.
Economics can inform law, but at this point, efficacy, not efficiency, must be the main goal.
87 See Hansen, James E., A Slippery Slope: How Much Global
Warming Constitutes “Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference,
68 Climate Change, 2005, p. 269, at p. 277 (stating that a 2°C
temperature rise “almost surely takes us well into the realm of
dangerous” climate change); Meinshausen, Malte, What Does a
2°C Target Mean for Greenhouse Gas Concentrations? A Brief
Analysis Based on Multi-Gas Emission Pathways and Several Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty Estimates, in Schellnhuber, Hans
Joachim et al. (eds.) Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change, 2006,
pp. 269-270, (estimating that limiting temperature rise to less
than 2°C likely requires a 55% reduction below 1990 emission
levels by 2050).
88 See generally Driesen, David M., The Economic Dynamics of
Environmental Law 200, pp. 3112-3119; McGarity, Thomas O.,
Some Thoughts on Deossifying the Rulemaking Process, 41
Duke L. J. 1992, p. 1385.
89 See, e.g, S. 280, supra note 21, § 124.

